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 A Moratorium on the Presentation of DNA Evidence 
 
 
 In recent decades, DNA evidence has become something of a pop-culture phenomenon. It 
can be found in popular magazines, in children’s books, and on television. All too often, DNA 
evidence is shown as irrefutable fact, a scientific fingerprint that allows for a black-and-white 
determination of guilt or innocence. Unfortunately, such depictions are inaccurate and dangerous.  
On October 12, 2017, the state of Texas executed Robert Lynn Pruett. Warden James Jones 
carried out the death sentence that Pruett received more than fifteen years earlier for the 1999 
murder of prison guard Daniel Nagle.1 At first glance, the case against Pruett seemed strong. Pruett 
was serving a ninety-nine-year sentence for a 1995 murder, and Pruett and Nagle often clashed. In 
fact, one of Nagle’s last acts as an officer was to reprimand Pruett. During the trial, one of Pruett’s 
fellow prisoners testified that he saw Pruett kill Nagle. Especially important to the case was the 
DNA evidence: a lab analyst testified that he found that Pruett’s DNA was on the murder weapon. 
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Pruett after a weeklong trial and sentenced him to die.2  
 On appeal, however, the evidence used at trial to connect Pruett to the crime was much less 
convincing. There was an eyewitness, but he was a notorious jailhouse informant and received a 
reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony. Similarly, while officers found a murder weapon, it 
was never established that Pruett possessed it. The entire case boiled down to DNA, and even that 
was inconclusive. During Pruett’s appeal, a second lab analyst examined the DNA on the weapon 
and determined that it could have come from thirty percent of the employees at the jail, and thirty-
one percent of the population of the United States.3 It was unconvincing evidence of guilt. 
Nonetheless, the scant DNA evidence, along with the inmate testimony, was enough for Pruett to be 
executed.4  
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  Unfortunately, Pruett’s case is not unusual, as faulty DNA collection or analysis persists 
across the entire criminal justice system. Indeed, this paper could have begun with the stories of any 
number of individuals exactly like Pruett, revealing an ugly truth: while the science behind DNA 
testing is strong, the gathering and application of DNA evidence is systematically flawed. These 
weaknesses lead to improper prosecution, provide an opportunity for evidence tampering and, as in 
Pruett’s case, can result in misidentification and wrongful execution. Despite the serious 
consequences of misapplied DNA evidence, the justice system has not fully examined these issues. 
This paper attempts to address wrongful convictions by calling for a temporary moratorium on the 
presentation of DNA evidence at trial, implemented until federal standards are put in place to 
regulate the presentation of DNA evidence, and until robust studies indicate the prevalence of DNA 
transfer.5 This paper will demonstrate that DNA analysis schemes are dangerously flawed and that 
they allow for various outcomes, ranging from understandable human error to the exploitation of an 
already unstable system.6 It will then argue that the current reliance on DNA analysis differs from 
what its legislative creators intended, and will propose solutions to current problems in DNA testing 
procedures, including amending jury instructions, minimum prosecution guidelines, and handling 
standards. A moratorium is the best way to achieve such a holistic review.  
The Science of DNA 
 Before examining issues related to DNA testing, it is necessary to understand what DNA is 
and how it is used in forensic investigations. DNA is the famous foundational molecule of genetics, 
the molecular building block of life. In technical terms, DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, a 
long string of nucleotides—genes—located within almost every cell of the human body.7 DNA is a 
set of instructions for human development, determining stature, hair color, and eye color, among 
other qualities.8 Experts use DNA when conducting forensic investigations because it contains 
segments known as short-tandem repeats (STRs).9 While every person has STRs, each person’s 
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 STRs are located in slightly different positions on the DNA strand.10 An individual’s unique 
arrangement of STRs is known as a genetic profile. Any body fluids or skin cells, for instance, left 
at a crime scene can be processed to reveal their STR pattern, which can then be compared to an 
STR sample taken from the suspect.11 This process is exact because no two people—except 
identical twins—have exactly the same STR profile.12  
 DNA analysts use several methods to test DNA gathered from a crime scene or from an 
individual. In the most common approach, known as polymerase chain reaction testing, an analyst 
uses a machine to replicate and then rinse cells with enzymes to draw out the DNA and separate it 
into STRs.13 These STRs are placed on gel plates, which separate the DNA into thirteen bands.14 A 
second method, amplified fragment length polymorphism testing, mixes small samples of DNA, 
called trace DNA, with more powerful enzymes in order to draw out DNA from the smaller number 
of cells.15 An analyst then compares the STR bands on the gel plate containing the evidence with an 
STR plate made from a suspect’s DNA. If the genetic material from a crime scene matches a 
suspect’s profile, analysts conclude that the suspect “cannot be excluded,” meaning that he or she 
may potentially be the source of the DNA—a match.16 If the gel plates are not identical, the suspect 
“cannot be included,” meaning that they were not the source of the sample.17 If the DNA from the 
crime scene yields fewer than thirteen STRs, it is termed a “partial profile.”18 
 Given the obvious potential for identifying criminals, it was not long after its discovery that 
DNA testing was applied to forensic science. In the late 1980s, the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) determined DNA testing to be “the most feasible and reliable” method of determining 
the perpetrator of a crime.19 Scientists at the DOJ reached this conclusion because DNA testing is 
“scientifically valid,” meaning that if DNA testing is carried out properly, a scientist can make an 
accurate identification.20 If an STR gel plate matches another STR plate, according to the DOJ, the 
cells must come from the same place.21 Once lab reports are completed and evidence analyzed, data 
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 is input into the National DNA Index System, which is a shared database among the federal 
government, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and all fifty states.22 
 Since the introduction of DNA evidence, DNA testing has become so firmly rooted in the 
popular culture that it regularly appears in television shows and movies. Especially prominent on 
the long-running television drama Crime Scene Investigation (popularly known as CSI), DNA 
evidence is often shown as irrefutable science. This depiction has become embedded in the larger 
public consciousness, a phenomenon known as the “CSI Effect.”  
 Unfortunately, even if DNA testing reveals a match or even a partial match, the suspect may 
be innocent. However, the erroneous match is not due to a scientific error. While the outcome of 
DNA testing appears absolute, the gathering and application of DNA evidence are dangerously 
flawed. DNA testing may have a nonexistent scientific error rate, but it has a high human one.  
Problems with DNA Forensics 
 While testing DNA is relatively precise, our understanding of how DNA interacts with a 
crime scene is anything but. Evidence is typically collected by amassing samples of genetic 
material, such as blood and semen, and by “swabbing” the crime scene for less visible material.23 
Such practices are flawed as DNA can transfer from person to person. In one study, researchers 
found that DNA was transferred from one person to another, and then to a third location, in all 
tested conditions—including through handshakes.24 This transfer means that although cells may 
originate on an individual, that individual may never have been in the location in which his cells are 
found.25 The scientists also found that large samples of DNA could remain at a third location for 
more than two weeks.26 Trace DNA can linger for years.27 These DNA remnants allow for a random 
third party’s DNA to end up as evidence in a crime. The study concludes that DNA transfer is not 
“well understood,” but makes it “impossible and/or impractical” to “identify with certainty the 
biological source” of any DNA sample.28 DNA technology is effective at determining the physical 
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 source of DNA.29 DNA transfer, however, makes it difficult to guarantee that the source of the 
DNA—a suspect—was actually present at the location at all, much less at a specific time.  
 Furthermore, although the science of DNA testing is objective, the standards for comparing 
forensic STR gel plates to human profiles are not, leading to a situation where human understanding 
of DNA results is flawed. Henry C. Lee, a noted professor and forensic science expert, wrote that 
there are “no generally accepted or national standards for determining what constitutes a match.”30 
In short, what looks like a match can depend on who is conducting the analysis. While a scientific 
result should be empirical, limitations in technology and training often mean that a random analyst 
determines the result of a DNA test. In fact, two different analysts at two different labs in the same 
state may draw different conclusions—interpreting the results in two different ways—when 
analyzing DNA and artifacts while the DNA sample is tested, even if they are using the same 
technology and have the same education.31 In one study, seventeen laboratory analysts were shown 
a sample featuring eleven STR bands and asked to determine if that sample came from the same 
source as a complete DNA profile.32 One analyst found that a test profile could not be excluded, 
four concluded it was inconclusive, and twelve thought that the DNA could be included.33 While the 
DOJ was correct in asserting that DNA testing is “scientifically valid,” they problematically 
assumed that was true fort he entire process of DNA analysis.34 It is not. These varying results 
demonstrate the legal nuisance that derives from a single scientific starting point. Although testing 
yields an accurate portrait of an individual’s DNA, whether or not that DNA “matches” another 
individual profile is currently a matter of judgment.  
 Additionally, there are few guidelines dictating proper methods for the application of DNA 
evidence at trial. The rules and laws governing DNA testimony are nearly non-existent, and various 
legal and professional bodies, each with its own interpretation of regulations, muddy the waters 
where rules do exist.35 When prosecutors present DNA evidence in a trial court, they generally do 
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 so by questioning an analyst from the laboratory where the DNA was tested. However, the scientist 
who testifies is not always the same person who conducted the test.36 Laboratory analysts are 
allowed and expected to testify in the place of other laboratory employees.37 This practice is 
especially dangerous in light of the fact that two analysts may interpret results differently.  
 Beyond differences in judgment, various forensic experts, population geneticists, and 
statisticians disagree on what constitutes a match.38 Ronald S. Reinstein, presiding judge of the 
Superior Court of Arizona, reasoned that two different “relevant, reliable, qualitative expert 
opinion[s]” could reach very different conclusions about the same evidence at trial and would 
present that evidence in different ways.39 Many laboratories that conduct DNA testing have 
separated analysts into two categories: “research” and “experts,” with the former conducting the 
testing and the latter reporting it at trial.40 Jonathan Koehler, a behavioral theorist and professor of 
law at Northwestern University, found this practice to have a “large impact” on a mock jurors’ 
assessment of guilt or innocence.41 
 Furthermore, while the basic science of DNA testing is the same in all labs, the labs 
themselves vary widely.42 Private facilities often feature separate air conditioning systems for each 
laboratory technician and generally provide sterile and sealed workspaces.43 Public laboratories, on 
the other hand, feature analysts working side by side in a large room without any way to prevent 
contamination.44 Well-regarded private laboratories have established uniform codes for handling 
DNA evidence, largely because the Department of Justice requires that they “perform quality DNA 
tests according to accepted procedures,” a mandate not enforced against public labs.45 The DOJ 
forced private labs to standardize “evidence handling, protocol validation, and the documentation of 
results, proficiency testing, and quality assurance.”46 Their practices include ventilation 
requirements and the wearing of rubber gloves.47 These standards, designed and implemented over a 
several-year-period, have significantly lowered error rates.48 Public labs were not held to the same 
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 standard because lawmakers did not want to create a backlog in DNA testing, so only new labs were 
forced to uphold standards.49 Setting standards for all labs would lead to a national reduction in 
errors, and it is clear that the current situation requires such action. 
The current practices of DNA analysis also depart from the intention of those who 
advocated for the use of DNA evidence in the first place. Judges often recognize that the intent of a 
law is as important as the law itself, meaning that laws should follow the intent of their creators.50 
In the 1989 Senate hearings relating to the admission of DNA evidence into court, Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, lauded the “tremendous potential” of 
“genetic testing as a means of criminal identification.”51 He and the committee were proud to 
introduce a method that they hoped would “improve substantially the capabilities of forensic 
investigators.”52 Their excitement, however, was based on DNA’s ability to “go much further 
toward criminal identification…with much more accuracy,” not on the science of DNA testing 
itself, which had not even been fully developed.53 Hatch and the committee argued that DNA 
evidence would be allowed only so long as it was “equal” in collection and sampling, “standard” in 
testing, and “evenly applied” in court.54 Hatch stated that his excitement for DNA was because of a 
belief that DNA could “protect the innocent,” rather than help convict others.55 He concluded by 
noting that “…as one who believes that the individual needs protection from [emphasis original] the 
government…I wish to ensure that DNA testing…is conducted in a constitutionally sound 
matter.”56 Unfortunately, that reality has not materialized: instead of identifying criminals, current 
use of DNA evidence leads to the incarceration of innocent people. 
 Finally, some false matches are also malicious. There have been numerous cases of 
misconduct, falsifying and planting evidence, and false reports by forensic scientists at state crime 
labs. In fact, crime labs in North Carolina, Washington, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and California have 
been investigated and fined for crime lab misconduct.57 In 1993, West Virginia DNA analyst Fred 
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 Zain was found to have tampered with evidence in 133 cases, including cases where innocent men 
were wrongfully imprisoned.58 In 2002, the Houston, Texas Crime Lab closed down after forty-
three cases in which employees fabricated evidence in a single year.59 Policies have not changed 
since these abuses occurred.60 While it is often difficult to tamper with physical evidence, a single 
analyst can change the result of hundreds of cases by intentionally (or accidentally) contaminating a 
sample of DNA. In light of the lack of standards, testing subjectivity, flawed expert testimony, and 
ease of contamination, the current application of DNA evidence needs amending. 
Why a Moratorium on the Presentation of DNA Is the Best Solution 
 There are several possible approaches to the current problems with the use of DNA 
evidence, ranging from maintaining the status quo to temporarily suspending the presentation of 
DNA evidence, to an all-out moratorium. Each solution is imperfect: If status quo practices 
continue, additional numbers of innocent people will be incarcerated. An intermediate solution, 
such as state-level policy change, is likely to take years and will still see a number of innocent 
people in prison while reforms are carried out. Finally, a moratorium will result in delays and 
increases in spending because of laboratory renovations. This section will address each potential 
solution and advocate that, despite potential drawbacks, a moratorium on the presentation of DNA 
evidence presents the most just way to reform current practices. 
 Although there are a number of possible solutions, one point is clear: The Supreme Court 
has held that arbitrary punishments are unconstitutional. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court 
decided in Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty schemes used in the United States were 
fundamentally arbitrary and thus unconstitutional: The Court should apply the same standard to 
current DNA prosecution. In Furman, Justice Potter Stewart stated that legal systems were 
fundamentally unfair when they produced a verdict that was akin to “being struck by lightning.”61 
He was writing about the death penalty, a process he found repulsive not because of moral or 
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 scientific qualms but because it was “…so wantonly and freakishly imposed.”62 The justices writing 
in the majority in Furman were not concerned about the imposition of capital punishment, but 
rather about convictions of innocent people and the arbitrary application of sentences.  
 Current methods of gathering, testing, and applying DNA evidence result in arbitrary 
sentences. While there is little scholarship studying harmful uses of DNA evidence, anecdotes 
abound. In Mitchell v. Gibson, a forensic chemist gave testimony stating that blood and semen 
stains matched a defendant.63 A few years later, an independent review board of analysts found that 
the DNA could not have come from the defendant.64 In 1986, Jeffrey Pierce was convicted for rape 
and sodomy and sentenced to fifty-four years in prison based on a contaminated DNA sample.65 He 
was exonerated after the FBI investigated misconduct by the lab analyst and discovered the 
contamination.66 Although anecdotes are not as reliable as studies, they have served as the basis for 
moratoriums and panels that debunked dozens of “junk-science” cases throughout the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s.67 In those cases, individuals have been found innocent of the crime that forensic 
evidence “proved” that they committed. DNA testing is simply a new iteration of an old problem. 
Given that the current practices and techniques used to gather, analyze, and report on DNA 
evidence are not well understood and our own analysis of DNA is arbitrary, it is clear that practices 
must be reformed. 
 One possible reform would be state and local legislation that regulates labs and standardizes 
courtroom practice. While state and local regulatory agencies could provide much-needed change, 
the reform process would be slow. In fact, many state legislatures, especially those in the south, 
only meet for one-hundred days every two years.68 In such instances, it often takes several sessions 
for bills to be enacted—if at all. During the multi-year waiting period individuals will be wrongfully 
convicted. 
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  If the justice system promises equality under the law, then a moratorium on the presentation 
of DNA evidence is the best solution. Although statistics examining the number of people 
wrongfully convicted because of DNA evidence are few in number, studies examining overturned 
convictions demonstrate that individual analysts have contaminated thousands of cases across the 
country. In one survey of 137 trial transcripts of those wrongfully convicted, eleven (8 percent) of 
those wrongfully convicted had a prosecution that included faulty trace DNA analysis, DNA 
transfer, or overly subjective interpretation of test results.69 That figure likely underreports the 
percentage of wrongful convictions resulting from misuse of DNA evidence because Innocence 
Projects, the organizations responsible for many of the sampled exonerations, generally do not 
pursue cases where there is already tested DNA evidence.70 Much as Stewart reasoned that those 
selected for the death penalty were a “capriciously selected random handful” of individuals, those 
who suffer from errors in DNA testing are similarly struck by lightning: DNA evidence often 
inflicts irrevocable harm to a defendant’s case.71 Many prosecutors and DNA advocates slip into a 
utilitarian view of DNA evidence, implying that a few wrongful convictions are outweighed by 
incarcerating the guilty. However, as William Blackstone wrote while editing his edition on English 
Common Law: “… the law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent party 
suffer.”72 It is time to give this phrase meaning when it comes to DNA.  
 The most obvious critique of a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence is that such 
a standstill would delay justice for thousands of accused people in order to enact reforms that could 
happen at any time. It is true that a moratorium would delay criminal cases. However, current 
practices already result in a significant delay. In fact, in the current system, trials involving murder 
and sexual assault crimes already take two or more years to reach the trial court.73 While a years-
long moratorium would increase case processing time, it would also provide a more just outcome in 
a significant number of cases. Further, while incremental reforms on a state-by-state or county-by-
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 county basis would lead to favorable outcomes in some instances, such action would only increase 
the arbitrary nature of DNA evidence: some areas may voluntarily adopt higher standards, while 
others will continue to do nothing. Finally, legislative change without a moratorium on the 
presentation of evidence would allow additional wrongful convictions to occur for the sake of 
expediency as DNA would continue to define cases and convictions. Such an idea is contrary to 
justice.  
 As many are already wrongly behind bars—partly as a result of DNA testimony, a failed 
understanding of DNA transfer, and subjectivity in test results—a moratorium on the presentation of DNA 
evidence at trial, would continue to allow for post-conviction DNA testing of those already convicted. To 
address the possible injustice and continue the exoneration of those wrongfully convicted, there could be a 
special review board to ensure the integrity of post-conviction DNA testing during the moratorium.74 
Appellate litigators could continue to contest previous DNA evidence and could continue to get DNA testing 
performed in labs across the country. Such appellate action provides an important outlet for the wrongfully 
convicted, as those already prejudiced by the improper gathering, testing and application of DNA need relief 
as well. Although there would still be a risk of contamination and malpractice, those already wrongfully 
convicted have little to lose and a great deal to gain through additional testing. 
How a Moratorium Would Help: Solutions to a Complex Problem  
 A moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence would allow for more of the nation’s 
crime labs to be accredited, forcing them to comply with standards. Indeed, the chief reason that 
accreditation has not occurred in all crime labs is that it would “prolong” the DNA testing process, 
despite the fact that accreditation takes just over a week.75 Further, states argue that the $10,000 to 
$15,000 cost of accreditation, plus the cost of any changes required to bring a lab up to compliance, 
would lead to “rate increases” that would make it impossible to run a crime lab and become 
certified as accredited at the same time.76 This claim is dubious at best, because processing a single 
case of DNA evidence, from collection to presentation in a courtroom, costs $1400, almost one-
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 tenth of the cost of the accreditation process.77 Given that crime labs process thousands of DNA 
tests per year, even a substantial renovation charge—averaging $500,000—is only a fraction of 
annual costs due to testing alone.78 State and private crime labs run thousands of tests per year. 
Even if states could not spare the additional money for accreditation, a moratorium would allow for 
a several-year interval to direct their funds towards ensuring that their labs were practicing at the 
highest level and ensuring a standard outcome. Accreditation would go a long way towards 
improving the current use of DNA in criminal proceedings.   
 While a moratorium on presenting DNA evidence would likely lead to a backlog of DNA evidence, 
such a backlog would not be exceptional. The number of rape and homicide cases with possible biological 
evidence that has not been submitted to a laboratory for analysis is already over 221,000.79 The number of 
unanalyzed DNA cases reported by state and local crime laboratories is more than 57,000.80 The total crime 
cases with possible biological evidence backlogged at forensic laboratories is over 500,000.81 While the 
current backlog of DNA evidence is regrettable, it is not a reason to justify continued inaction.  
Application and Education 
 A moratorium on presenting DNA evidence would also allow for a standardized application 
of DNA testing results in court. Currently, every crime lab reports data in a different way.82 While 
the existing Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database system is better than no system at all, 
data entered into CODIS can be input in different formats.83 This structure impedes the ability of 
lawyers and judges to understand what the reports say and whether the tests were done properly, as 
they rarely see information presented in a standard format. This variety makes it even more difficult 
to understand the already complex data. Furthermore, crime labs do not have to report what kinds of 
tests were carried out; they only have to report that tests were carried out.84 In these instances, 
where the specific test results are unavailable, it is difficult for appellate attorneys to make claims 
about innocence or guilt related to DNA, depriving the client of due process.85 The current 
shortcomings of CODIS provide another reason for advocating a moratorium. In 2014, the Federal 
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 Bureau of Investigation released a letter indicating that an expansion of CODIS was necessary, and 
without a complete moratorium, partial changes would take nearly eighteen months to implement, 
during which time the database would be difficult to access.86 The overhaul of the system necessary 
to standardize entry of data would require temporarily shutting down CODIS, a process that could 
not be done in stages.87 While some states have constitutional amendments indicating that 
defendants have a right to DNA testing during appeals, most states do not.88 This structure allows 
for DNA evidence introduced by the prosecution to be used in a trial but makes it difficult for an 
individual to challenge the tests on appeal. A moratorium on the use of this information would 
allow the DNA database system to be standardized and become efficient. Such a change would help 
ensure that both the prosecution and defense have access to the same information in both trial and 
appellate settings.  
 During a moratorium on presenting DNA evidence, law enforcement departments, district 
attorneys, and state attorneys general could also work to make sure that prosecutors have a firm 
educational foundation in forensic science. Unfortunately, many lawyers, analysts, jurors, and 
judges do not understand the science behind DNA testing and lack the necessary background to tell 
whether a DNA match was even determined by objective analysis.89 In recent years, several studies 
have found that prosecutor’s “self-expressed supposed level of understanding” of DNA evidence “is 
quite high and thus not justified by their levels of proper understanding.90 Another study indicated 
that lawyers, analysts, jurors, and judges had an “uneven approach in DNA education to date,” 
meaning that many received no formal education on DNA litigation, while others were well versed 
in the scientific literature.91 It is partly the role of lawyers to prevent miscarriages of justice, and 
they play a significant role in preventing substandard and poorly tested DNA evidence from being 
adduced in criminal trials. In order to fulfill this ethical duty, lawyers require both a penetrative 
understanding of such evidence and the skills necessary to expose potential problems associated 
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 with it. A moratorium is the best way to guarantee that all involved in the presentation of DNA 
evidence, from the analyst who collects the samples to the jury who uses them to reach a decision, 
receive the education necessary, and would ensure that presentations of DNA evidence come to a 
temporary standstill until lawyers have the training necessary to argue cases hinging on it. 
 A moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence would also allow for universal changes 
in jury instructions. Jury instructions are the directives given to a jury by the presiding judge and are 
compiled from reports submitted by the lawyers. These instructions are designed to help juries 
better understand complex legal and scientific topics.92 This process is flawed, not only because 
jury instructions differ each time, but also because often none of the parties involved necessarily 
have the formal education that allows them to understand how DNA works, much less explain it. In 
fact, “trial judges tend to adopt a conservative approach” to jury selection and are “reluctant to 
deviate from language approved by higher courts,” which in turn look to established law.93 A 
moratorium handed down by the Supreme Court or Justice Department would place significant 
pressure on the legislatures to provide better guidance, which would likely result in change. A 
moratorium’s halting of the criminal justice system would force state and federal legislators to 
adopt laws that change jury instructions. While these instructions could be developed without a 
moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence, education would be most effective in 
combination with the other reforms outlined in this paper. 
 During a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence at trial, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges could take the time to determine a proper, well managed, and understandable 
accounting of current practices in DNA evidence. Their program could be utilized nation-wide. A 
moratorium would provide the time necessary to allow them to agree on a statement that would be 
read at all trials where DNA evidence is introduced. In one study, conducted on jurors in North 
Carolina, only 12.85 percent of jurors understood DNA transfer as explained by judges in a 
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 composite instruction.94 After rewriting of the instructions by prosecutors and defense attorneys, 80 
percent of jurors were able to paraphrase the meaning of the statement and expressed a greater 
understanding of the issues surrounding DNA.95 Nationwide rollout of such a practice would benefit 
the justice system and help mitigate criminal cases involving DNA.  
Science and the CSI Effect 
 Perhaps the most important reason for a DNA moratorium is that such an action would 
dramatically alter the popular conception of DNA evidence. Currently, jurors and judges alike have 
an unconscious faith in the invulnerability of DNA, more so than for any other type of evidence.96 
This bolstering is called the CSI Effect. The CSI Effect, according to Michael J. Saks, a professor at 
Arizona State University College of Law, suggests that media programs, such as CSI, “wildly 
exaggerate and glorify forensic science,” a process that “affects the public… by creating greater 
expectations about forensic science than can be delivered.”97 Such an effect “burdens the defense by 
creating exaggerated faith in the capabilities and reliability of the sciences.”98 Legal scholars 
Donald Shelton and Kim Young have found that the origins of these expectations “lie in the broader 
permeation of the changes in our popular culture brought about by…rapid advances in science and 
information technology…and news.”99 Shelton and Young conclude that the only way to properly 
educate the public about DNA evidence is to forcibly adjust court proceedings so that both the 
media and legal experts can understand that DNA evidence is not always accurate.100 By amending 
jury instructions, and better understanding the role of the media in shaping public conceptions of 
DNA evidence, the judicial system can better account for unconscious bias during proceedings. 
While the legal system has little hope of influencing media coverage, better accounting for its 
effects among analysts, lawyers, judges, and jurors would lead to fairer outcomes. A prosecution 
moratorium would accomplish that goal.  
15
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  The very act of calling such a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence at trial 
would discourage the general belief that DNA science is infallible. While the CSI Effect is a real 
phenomenon, the American belief in science extends far beyond cable television. In fact, Bruce 
Sales and Daniel Shuman, professors of psychology at American University, note that many juries 
are prone to believe science and scientists simply because they are scientists.101 Public faith remains 
even if there are not “objective criteria” or any “demonstrable scientific foundation” to such an 
expert’s testimony, as in the case of DNA evidence.102 It is even harder for juries to set aside pro-
science bias and adjudicate claims that are partially true, as is the case with faulty DNA evidence.103 
This revelation leads to two conclusions. The first is that juries need assistance in recognizing the 
flaws in science. By placing a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence at trial, courts 
would elevate national dialogue surrounding DNA evidence. Such a change in the judicial system 
would undoubtedly generate media coverage and began changing public (and thus jury-member) 
expectations. Second, a moratorium would allow for the imposition of standards that would 
decrease the onus placed on a jury. While juries are currently expected to be able to adjudicate 
between faulty evidence and sound evidence, increasing standards in laboratories and in the 
courtroom would make discernment almost unnecessary by providing obvious examples of the 
proper application of DNA evidence. Juries would have a clear idea of what is good and bad DNA 
analysis, and could clearly identify times when rules were violated. 
Counterfactual and Concluding Thoughts 
  The principle objection to a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence is simply its 
difficulty. A moratorium would undoubtedly be a difficult undertaking, radically changing the 
shape of the modern criminal trial. The recommendations presented in this paper would require that 
all jurors undergo a brief training session, either through amended jury instructions or an additional 
activity.  The moratorium would require that crime labs meet rigorous standards and follow 
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 standard procedures. Nonetheless, simply being difficult is no reason to abstain from correction. A 
DNA moratorium would provide the time necessary to correct serious systemic issues in gathering 
and application of DNA evidence, and how that evidence is presented at trial.  
Contemporary problems in the gathering, testing, and application of DNA evidence 
necessitate the imposition of a moratorium on the presentation of DNA evidence. While DNA 
evidence is undoubtedly a precise and useful tool in criminal prosecution, the lack of clear standards 
and oversight sacrifice the innocent for the sake of the appearance of a conviction. Those 
advocating for additional prosecutions using DNA do so not out of bad faith but out of a desire for 
additional justice. If justice is the goal, then policy-makers and justices must align themselves with 
a founding principle of the American legal system: that each case must be judged on its own merits. 
Such an examination requires a rigorous look at multiple stages of the DNA process and a thorough 
understanding of each step. The current schemes and timeline applied to cases complicate justice 
and promote haste. While “moratorium” might literally mean “to delay,” in this instance, a delay 
would expedite justice. The overall goal should be to accelerate our efforts to provide justice. While 
it might be too late for Robert Pruett, there are many others who can still be saved.  
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